Tolerance to uncertainty predicts prosocial behavior This paper offers an interesting and clean distinction between risk and ambiguity. It is confusing strange that the title talks about tolerance to uncertainty, as the author/s even in the abstract make the distinction between ambiguous and risky uncertainty. While the distinction is appreciated, I do not think that the specific tests allows the researchers to conclude that tolerance to ambiguous uncertainty is more important than risky uncertainty. Study 1 simply shows that risk x trial has a tvalue of -1.42, while the ambiguity x trial has a t-value of -2.66. So, this should leave one, statistically, unconvinced. The distinction is not further tested critically in Studies 2 and 3. In fact, later the author/s note that they are simply interested in whether tolerance to ambiguity predictions to trust, which does not seem a very ambitious goal. It would be more ambitious if they show that it is only the ambiguity above and beyond risk that accounts for the tendencies to trust and prosociality. That test is never provided. But even if that test would be significant across studies (which I doubt) then, in my view, the magnitude of the empirical contribution would merit publication in Nature C ommunication. It is a nice to know, but still an incremental contributio n.
attitudes. The study design is elegant, and the paper is clearly written. I am worried, however, that the results are quite weak, and have some questions regarding the design, analysis and results.
-Risk and ambiguity attitudes are quantified with a choice task in experiments 1 and 2, but in experiment 3 subjects instead fill out the Multidimensional Attitude Towards Ambiguity -why? What is the relationship between these two measures of ambiguity attitudes?
-The results of experiment 1 were a bit confusing to me. The authors report a significant effect of ambiguity attitudes, and a significant interaction between ambiguity attitude and trial number, b oth interesting findings. The authors reason that tolerance to ambiguity leads to higher willingness to contribute, and that as ambiguity is reduced with time individual differences in ambiguity attitudes should play a smaller role in the decision to contribute. From the visualization of the effect in Figure  1D , however, it seems that those individuals who were tolerant to ambiguity are the ones that changed their behavior along the experiment, and contributed less with time. C onversely, ambiguityaverse subjects did not seem to change their behavior -this seems at odd with the authors' interpretation of the results.
-The results of experiment 2 are also not completely clear and seem rather weak. Were the post -hoc tests corrected for multiple comparisons? Ambiguity reduced the transfer to the trustworthy trustee, but not to the untrustworthy trustee, which the authors interpret as reflecting different perceptions of uncertainty in the positive and negative domains. If that's the case, what is the explanat ion for the opposite effect observed for the neutral trustee (increased transfers in the ambiguous condition)? In addition, the use of two models was confusing to me -why not just use the full model? Was there a main effect of ambiguity level in either of these models? I also did not understand the authors' explanation for the lack of correlation between ambiguity attitudes and the effect of ambiguity levelisn't the exogenous manipulation of ambiguity exactly what you would expect to interact with individual ambiguity attitudes?
-More generally, all of my concerns would be alleviated if the results were stronger. A potential remedy would be to replicate the findings in a new sample. The numbers of subjects in experiments 1 and 2 are moderate (38 and 37), and a replication should be relatively easy, and will substantially strengthen the manuscript. Experiment 3 includes 99 subjects, so a potential way to go would be to divide the data into two and see whether the effect is replicated in each half.
R1 Comment 1: This paper offers an interesting and clean distinction between risk and ambiguity. It is confusing strange that the title talks about tolerance to uncertainty, as the author/s even in the abstract make the distinction between ambiguous and risky uncertainty. While the distinction is appreciated, I do not think that the specific tests allows the researchers to conclude that tolerance to ambiguous uncertainty is more important than risky uncertainty. Study 1 simply shows that risk x trial has a t-value of -1.42, while the ambiguity x trial has a t-value of -2.66. So, this should leave one, statistically, unconvinced.
The distinction is not further tested critically in Studies 2 and 3. In fact, later the author/s note that they are simply interested in whether tolerance to ambiguity predictions to trust, which does not seem a very ambitious goal. It would be more ambitious if they show that it is only the ambiguity above and beyond risk that accounts for the tendencies to trust and prosociality. That test is never provided. But even if that test would be significant across studies (which I doubt) then, in my view, the magnitude of the empirical contribution would merit publication in Nature Communication. It is a nice to know, but still an incremental contribution. (Clogg, Petkova, & Haritou, 1995 Where Risk Attitude is indexed by subject ( ) and Trial Number is indexed by subject and trial ( , ). Ambiguity Attitudes were inverted to align on the same scale as Risk Attitudes. Cooperation is coded as defect (0) and cooperate (1). AIC=2072.1.
R1 Comment 2:
Other concerns are why the authors found that ambiguity tolerance is relevant to Untrustworthy Trustees (and not to Trustworthy Trustees) In Study 2, while Study 3 reveals still different patterns. As to Study 3, people would like to see a significant effect (that the relationship between ambiguity tolerance and prosocial behavior can be abolished) as expressed by a significant statistical interaction of ambiguity tolerance and a variable that gets at degree of abolishment. A study with another design would be required. Again, the ultimate test of the key role of ambiguity tolerance (independent of risk) has yet to be provided. Reviewer 2: R2 Comment 1: This is an interesting paper, which asks an intriguing and unexplored question -what is the role of individual uncertainty attitudes in social behavior. A strength of the paper is the distinction between risk and ambiguity, and the use of a separate, nonsocial, task to estimate risk and ambiguity attitudes. The study design is elegant, and the paper is clearly written. I am worried, however, that the results are quite weak, and have some questions regarding the design, analysis and results. Risk and ambiguity attitudes are quantified with a choice task in experiments 1 and 2, but in experiment 3 subjects instead fill out the Multidimensional Attitude Towards Ambiguity -why? What is the relationship between these two measures of ambiguity attitudes? Table 4 , Fig 4B) , while tolerance to risk did not modulate cooperative behavior (P=0.32, see Table 4 , Fig S3) .
R2 Comment 2:
The results of experiment 1 were a bit confusing to me. The authors report a significant effect of ambiguity attitudes, and a significant interaction between ambiguity attitude and trial number, both interesting findings. The authors reason that tolerance to ambiguity leads to higher willingness to contribute, and that as ambiguity is reduced with time individual differences in ambiguity attitudes should play a smaller role in the decision to contribute. From the visualization of the effect in Figure 1D , however, it seems that those individuals who were tolerant to ambiguity are the ones that changed their behavior along the experiment, and contributed less with time. Conversely, ambiguity-averse subjects did not seem to change their behavior -this seems at odd with the authors' interpretation of the results. Figure 1 , and which can be found on page 6 of the manuscript, Fig 1C-D) .
Response: The Reviewer points out that the figures from Experiment 1 may lead a reader to believe that the effect is driven by ambiguity tolerance and not aversion. We apologize that this figure may have been misleading. In order to visualize the results (it is always difficult to plot 3 variables on one graph!), we median split ambiguity attitudes, characterizing subjects as either ambiguity tolerant or ambiguity averse. In reality, however, ambiguity attitudes are on a continuous scale and the results from the regression reflect this (e.g., tolerance to ambiguity and aversion to ambiguity are on opposite sides of the same continuum). When we plot the results using this median split method, it appears as if the results are a function of those who are ambiguity tolerant and not ambiguity averse, when in fact ambiguity attitudes is continuous and includes both tolerance and aversion. To minimize confusion surrounding the graphs, we have replotted the data using a 3D approach. This allows us to graphically illustrate that, as the Reviewer correctly states above, tolerance to ambiguity leads to a higher willingness to contribute early on in the PGG, and that as ambiguity is reduced with time (trials), individual differences in ambiguity attitudes play a smaller role in the decision to contribute. In other words, those who are tolerant to ambiguity are more willing at the beginning of the experiment to cooperate when ambiguous uncertainty is greatest, and this tendency to cooperate decreases over time. We copy this graph below (which has also replaced the original graphs from

R2 Comment 3:
The results of experiment 2 are also not completely clear and seem rather weak. Were the post-hoc tests corrected for multiple comparisons? Ambiguity reduced the transfer to the trustworthy trustee, but not to the untrustworthy trustee, which the authors interpret as reflecting different perceptions of uncertainty in the positive and negative domains. If that's the case, what is the explanation for the opposite effect observed for the neutral trustee (increased transfers in the ambiguous condition)? 
R2 Comment 4:
I also did not understand the authors' explanation for the lack of correlation between ambiguity attitudes and the effect of ambiguity level -isn't the exogenous manipulation of ambiguity exactly what you would expect to interact with individual ambiguity attitudes?
Response: We apologize that this was not clear in the original submission. We were surprised at the lack of correlation between ambiguity attitudes and our exogenous manipulation of ambiguous uncertainty. We reasoned that it is possible that the failure to observe a relationship between these two variables may be due to the fact that our manipulation was not strong enough. In our task, once a decision to trust was made, feedback from partners who were ambiguous were shown at half the rate (5 trials) as partners who were unambiguous (all 10 trials), with the idea being that less information about a partner's reciprocation or defection rate makes the social exchange more uncertain. However, it is possible that being exposed to 5 pieces of information about a person's moral character (through feedback about a partner's decision to reciprocate or defect) is enough evidence to disambiguate whether it is a good idea to trust, even for those who are ambiguity tolerant. Indeed, within the trust literature, subjects typically learn whether to trust (or distrust) their partner after reading a short description of their partner's moral character (Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005) . To put it another way, it is possible that our exogenous manipulation of ambiguity was not ambiguous enough. We have now clarified this point in the manuscript, page 10.
R2 Comment 5:
More generally, all of my concerns would be alleviated if the results were stronger. A potential remedy would be to replicate the findings in a new sample. The numbers of subjects in experiments 1 and 2 are moderate (38 and 37), and a replication should be relatively easy, and will substantially strengthen the manuscript. Experiment 3 includes 99 subjects, so a potential way to go would be to divide the data into two and see whether the effect is replicated in each half. I have read the revision, and I am pleased to note that all my concerns have been successfully reduced so that I have sufficient confidence in the overall conclusions of this paper. Ambiguity matters more than risk in uncertainty in the situations examined. In my view, the authors have done a good job at collecting more data, and performing statistical analyses that, taken togethe, provide a more convincing test that ambiguity matters more than risk.
Also, I like the authors'reasoning why ambiguity should matter so much in the social (dyadic) world. I wonder, though, why risk do not seem to matter at all, at least in the games studied. Potential explanations for the latter non-finding deserve a bit more attention, in my view.
Reviewer #2 (Remarks to the Author):
The authors have done an impressive job in responding to reviewers' comments. I especially commend them for collecting the additional data, which substantially strengthen their arguments.
I have a couple of remaining minor comments: -I think my comment about the dynamic changes in experiment 1 was not clear. The authors now provide a new Figure (1D) , which is very nice, but, unless I'm missing something, shows the same thing that was shown before. That is, the subjects who changed their behavior along the experiment were those that were more tolerant to ambiguity. Subjects who were relatively ambiguity averse, did not cooperate much in the beginning, and continued to behave in a similar manner, even when ambiguity was reduced. Subjects who were relatively ambiguity tolerant, cooperated more at the beginning, but reduced their cooperation with the resolving of ambiguity. Was this an adaptive change in the context of this experiment? In other words, knowing the behavior of other players, was it more beneficial to cooperate less? -A related question is about Experiment 3: the authors report that once ambiguity was resolved, ambiguity attitudes no longer contributed to cooperation -was this change in the same direction as in Experiment 1, i.e. did ambiguity-tolerant subjects cease to cooperate? And was it an adaptive change in the context of Experiment 3?
Reviewer #1
I have read the revision, and I am pleased to note that all my concerns have been successfully reduced so that I have sufficient confidence in the overall conclusions of this paper. Ambiguity matters more than risk in uncertainty in the situations examined. In my view, the authors have done a good job at collecting more data, and performing statistical analyses that, taken together, provide a more convincing test that ambiguity matters more than risk. Also, I like the authors' reasoning why ambiguity should matter so much in the social (dyadic) world. I wonder, though, why risk do not seem to matter at all, at least in the games studied. Potential explanations for the latter non-finding deserve a bit more attention, in my view. 
Reviewer #2:
I have a couple of remaining minor comments: -I think my comment about the dynamic changes in experiment 1 was not clear. The authors now provide a new Figure (1D) , which is very nice, but, unless I'm missing something, shows the same thing that was shown before. That is, the subjects who changed their behavior along the experiment were those that were more tolerant to ambiguity. Subjects who were relatively ambiguity averse, did not cooperate much in the beginning, and continued to behave in a similar manner, even when ambiguity was reduced. Subjects who were relatively ambiguity tolerant, cooperated more at the beginning, but reduced their cooperation with the resolving of ambiguity. Was this an adaptive change in the context of this experiment? In other words, knowing the behavior of other players, was it more beneficial to cooperate less?
Response 2: Defecting in a public goods game (PGG) is always the most efficient behavior in terms of maximizing individual monetary payoffs. In line with this, a frequent finding in the PGG literature is that people decrease their cooperation over time (Camerer & Fehr, 2004 -A related question is about Experiment 3: the authors report that once ambiguity was resolved, ambiguity attitudes no longer contributed to cooperation -was this change in the same direction as in Experiment 1, i.e. did ambiguity-tolerant subjects cease to cooperate? And was it an adaptive change in the context of Experiment 3? 
